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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMP ANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

A. P. NEILSON and LILLIE NEILSON, his wife,
WILLIAM ARTHUR WALLER and MINNIE
EULA WALLER, his wife, WILLIAM A. LEWIS
and JOANN D. LEWIS, his wife, EARL S.
SPAFFORD, GRANITE NATIONAL BANK,
KENT W. NORDGREN, JOHN G. MARSHALL,
JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT, HERSCHEL J.
SAPERSTEIN as the trustee in bankruptcy of
JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT, HERTA K. DENNETT, ALVIN I. SMITH, Receiver, UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION, UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, INTERSTATE BRICK COMPANY, SOUTHEAST READY MIX, BANK OF
SALT LAKE, UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION,
Defendants-Respondents.

CONSOLIDATED
CASES
12235 and
12348

BRIEF O,F·
P·LAINTIFF,.APP·ELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action which was instituted for the purpose
of foreclosing a Trust Deed, which had been executed by
A. P. Neilson and Lillie Neilson, his wife, to plaintiff, in
which the defendants John Elwood Dennett and Herta K.
1

Dennett interposed the defense that the Trust Deed could
not be foreclosed because a tender of delinquent install.
ments had been made.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court without a jury in
January and March, 1970. The court entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order in the case on
May 7, 1970, and the same were amended and supplemented by the Court July 30, 1970, September 30, 1970
and November 17, 1970, and a judgment and decree was
signed by the Court on November 17, 1970.
The trial court found that the Trust Deed, executed
by A. P. Neilson and Lillie Neilson, to plaintiff, dated
April 8, 1966, was a valid first lien against the real prop·
erty therein described. It further found that an addendum
to the Trust Deed, also dated April 8, 1966, provided
that in the event A. P. Neilson and Lillie Neilson con·
veyed any of their interest in said property, that the holder
of the note secured by the Trust Deed could declare the
unpaid balance immediately due and payable. On July
25, 1968, A. P. Neilson conveyed the property to one
Elsie Powers, who thereafter executed a deed to the prop·
erty to Herta K. Dennett. In October of 1968, three
monthly installments on the Trust Deed were delinquent.
On about October 24, 1968, John Elwood Dennett tender·
ed the amount of the three delinquent payments to plain·
tiff. Plaintiff refused to accept the tender and informed
John Elwood Dennett that the tender could not be accept·
ed since it was insufficient to cover late charges, costs and
2

attorneys' fees which had been incurred and because Dennett was not the borrower. The Court concluded that
plaintiff could not foreclose its Trust Deed and was not
entitled to its costs and attorneys' fees because the addendum to the Trust Deed was void as being against public
policy and because the tender was valid and sufficient and
plaintiff was obligated to accept the same.
The trial court ordered, adjudged and decreed that
the plaintiff's Trust Deed was a valid, first lien against
the real property covered thereby, having an unpaid principal balance of $76,726.20, and that there was past due to
the plaintiff on said Trust Deed as of October, 1970, the
sum of $22,733.38, representing unpaid principal and interest installment payments, taxes and insurance premiums. It gave the defendants until June 1, 1970 to pay the
sums past due on the Trust Deed. The time for paying
the past due sums was later extended by the Court to
July 30, 1970, then to September 30, 1970, then to October 20, 1970 and finally to October 26, 1970. It further ordered that plaintiff's right to foreclose its Trust
Deed be denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order, Judgment and
Decree of the trial court, and that the case be remanded
to the trial court to fix the amount of costs and attorneys'
fees to be awarded, to direct the disposition of the funds
in the hands of the Court and for a judgment ordering
foreclosure of the trust deed and sale of the property by
the sheriff in the manner provided by law for the fore-

3

closure of mortgages on real property to satisfy the indebtedness.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following are the facts in the case as found by
the trial court and set forth in the Findings of Fact as
amended and supplemented:
In February of 1966, A. P. Neilson made application
to Walker Bank & Trust Company for a loan on certain
real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 128)
At this time, Herta K. Dennett, the wife of John Elwood
Dennett, was the record title owner of said real property.
(R. 125-126) The loan application of A. P. Neilson was
approved by the plaintiff and on about April 8, 1966, the
loan was closed. (R. 128, 129) On that date Herta K.
Dennett executed and delivered a Special Warranty Deed
to A. P. Neilson covering the property. John Elwood
Dennett executed a Quit-Claim Deed to A. P. Neilson
covering the property. (R. 129) A. P. Neilson and Lillie
Neilson, his wife, then executed a note in the sum of
$85,000 to plaintiff, dated April 8, 1966. (R. 129) At the
same time the Neilsons, to secure the payment of said note,
executed and delivered to plaintiff a Trust Deed covering
the real property which is the subject of this action. (R.
129)

At the time the loan was closed an addendum to said
Trust Deed was executed by A. P. Neilson and Lillie Neilson. The addendum stated:
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"It is mutually understood and agreed that
notwithstanding any other provision of the above
Trust Deed and the Note securing the same, that
in the event A. P. Neilson and Lillie Neilson transfer any of their interest in the property covered by
said Trust Deed, the holder of the Note secured
by said Trust Deed, may, at its option, declare the
entire unpaid balance thereof immediately due and
payable."
This addendum was shown to John Elwood Dennett
before the loan was closed and Dennett agreed that the
transaction proceed on the basis of the said addendum.
(R. 130) Both the Trust Deed and the addendum were
recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder on
April 12, 1966. (R. 129, 130)
On July 25, 1968, A. P. Neilson executed a deed conveying the property in question to one, Elsie S. Powers.
The money which was paid to A. P. Neilson for this deed
was furnished through John Elwood Dennett. Elsie S.
Powers then executed a Quit-Claim Deed conveying the
property to Herta K. Dennett. (R. 135)
After the conveyance of the property to Herta K.
Dennett no further payments were made on the trust deed.
By the middle of October, 1968, three monthly installment payments of $728.90 each were delinquent on the
Trust Deed and the real property taxes covering the property for the previous year remained unpaid. (R. 133,136)
Notice of these delinquencies was given by plaintiff and
on about October 24, 1968, John Elwood Dennett tendered a check to plaintiff in the sum of $2,186.70. The plaintiff refused to accept that tender and informed Dennett
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that the tender could not be accepted since it was insuffj.
dent to cover the late charges, costs and attorneys' fees,
which had been incurred and because Dennett was not
the borrower. (R. 136)
Suit was instituted, the case proceeded to trial and
following the trial the Court denied plaintiff the right to
foreclose its Trust Deed and gave the Dennetts until June
1, 1970, to pay the delinquent amounts and bring the loan
current. (R. 140, 142) The time to bring the loan current
was later extended by the Court to July 30, 1970, (R.
142) then to September 30, 1970, (R. 208, 209) then to
October 20, 1970 (R. 212) and finally to October 26,
1970. (R. 231-232) Although the supplemental Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law indicate that sufficient
sums were tendered by check on or before October 26,
1970, to bring the loan current (R. 232), and that the
tenders of these checks were in substantial compliance
with the Court's order as from time to time extended
(R. 233), in fact, payment of one of the checks represent·
ing part of the tender was stopped (R. 245).
The Court further ordered that until the appeal in
this case was decided, the monthly installment payments
commencing with the November, 1970 payment, be paid
when due to the Clerk of the Court, and that the 1970 real
property taxes assessed against the property be deposited
with the Clerk of the Court on or before November 30,
1970. (R. 224). This order was not complied with (R.
261).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE RIGHT TO FORECLOSE ITS TRUST DEED BECAUSE OF DEFENDANTS' CONVEYANCE OF THE PROPERTY IN DELIBERATE VIOLATION OF THE V AUD AND
LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE TERMS OF THE ADDENDUM.

At the time the plaintiff made its loan to A. P. Neilson, the Neilsons and plaintiff executed an addendum to
the Trust Deed which provided as follows:
"It is mutually understood and agreed that
notwithstanding any other provision of the above
Trust Deed and the Note securing the same, that
in the event A. P. Neilson and Lillie Neilson transfer any of their interest in the property covered
by said Trust Deed, the holder of the Note secured
by said Trust Deed, may, at its option, declare the
entire unpaid balance thereof immediately due and
payable."
This addendum was shown to John Elwood Dennett
prior to the time the loan was closed and Dennett agreed
that the transaction proceed on the basis of said addendum.
The Trust Deed and addendum were recorded together
on April 12, 1966. (R. 129-130) In July, 1968, Dennett
provided the funds to arrange a transfer of the property
by A. P. Neilson, and on July 25, 1968, A. P. Neilson
deeded the property to one, Elsie S. Powers. John Elwood
Dennett then obtained a deed conveying the property
from Elsie S. Powers to Herta K. Dennett. (R. 135)
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The Dennetts and the Neilsons were not only aware
of the restrictions in the addendum, but agreed, prior to
the time the loan was closed, that the loan be granted on
the basis of said addendum. Less than a year and a half
later Neilson and Dennett deliberately violated the terms
of said addendum by causing the property to be trans.
fer red, and after the property was transferred no further
payments were made on the trust deed.
It is plaintiff's contention that this deliberate violation gives the plaintiff the right to immediate payment
of the entre unpaid balance of the loan and to have its
Trust Deed foreclosed when such payment was not made.
The trial court ruled, however, that the addendum was
void as being against public policy and that plaintiff could
not foreclose its trust deed because of the violations of
the addendum by defendants (R. 139). The trial court
was in error in its ruling on this point.
In its ruling on this point the trial court may have

adopted Dennett's argument that the addendum created
some sort of unreasonable restraint on alienation. The
addendum cannot be construed as a provision which could
disable the Neilsons from conveying the property, however. The addendum does not state that any attempted
conveyance by the Neilsons is void or unenforceable. It
does not state that should the Neilsons attempt to convey
the property, the title of the Neilsons becomes divested.
The addendum does not provide that Walker Bank could
prevent the Neilsons, by injunction proceedings, an action
for specific performance, or otherwise from conveying
the property in violation of the addendum.

8
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All the addendum states is the date when the unpaid
balance of the note may become due and payable. That
date is the date when the Neilsons - the parties with
whom Walker Bank contracted - conveyed their interest
in Walker Bank's security. Such a provision which merely
sets forth a date on which the balance of the note becomes
due is not a restraint on alienation or otherwise against
public policy. A case directly in point on this matter is
Ray v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 40 P2d 663, 170
Okla. 414, 0934). In that case the defendant executed a
note which provided that the holder of the note might
declare the note due and payable should certain conditions
occur, including any change in the ownership of the business of the maker or any encumbrance of the maker's
stock in trade. The defendant contended that these provisions were contrary to public policy and were void. This
contention was rejected by the Oklahoma Supreme Court
and the validity of the note was sustained. The Court
stated:
"We are of the opinion that the only purpose
of the conditions was to accelerate the maturity of
the obligation in the event of their happening for
the protection of the plaintiff. Such conditions did
not prevent the sale of the property, but merely
provided for an earlier maturity of the obligation
in the event of the happening of the conditions
therein stated. We are unable to find anything oppressive in the conditions complained of."
Similar provisions which accelerate the due date of an
indebtedness on the happening of other contingencies
have uniformly been upheld by the Courts. E.g. Chambers
v. Marks, 9 So. 74, 93 Ala. 412, (Acceleration because of
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failure to pay taxes and insurance); Cedar Rapids National
Bank v. Snoozy, 215 NW 96, 55 N. Dak. 655, (acceleration
on maker's assignment for benefit of creditors).
The addendum in this case is nothing more than an
agreement between the parties as to the date when the
unpaid balance of the obligation will be due and payable.
Such acceleration provisions are valid and legally en·
forceable provisions. As stated by the Court in Messner
v. Mallory, 236 P.2d 898, 900, 107 Cal. App.2d 377
(1951):
"A provision in an agreement for accelerated
maturity is not in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture, but simply an agreement as to the time
when a debt shall become due and enforceable according to its terms. Such an agreement is a lawful one which the parties may enter into, and when
they do so the conditions will be enforced by courts
of equity. No forfeiture is involved in such act,
and no penalty imposed. Plaintiff is not asking
for anything that has been paid under the contract
by way of forfeiture, but is simply refusing to extend the credit for the reason that defendant has
failed to comply with his contract."
To the same effect see Harris v. Kessler, 12 P.2d 467, 124
Cal. App. 299, (1932) and Foreman v. Myers, 444 P.2d
589, 79 N.M. 404 0968).
A provision in a mortgage allowing the lender to
declare the unpaid balance of his loan due and payable
on sale by the mortgagor of his interest in the mortgaged
property is not only valid and enforceable, but is an en·
tirely reasonable provision. This becomes apparent on a
cursory examination of the relationship of the parties in
10

a morgage loan transaction. Most mortgage loan transactions contemplate a continuing relationship between the
borrower and the lender over a long period of time. Many
mortgage and trust deeds run for a period of up to 30
years. The trust deed involved in this case was to run for
a period of 10 years provided the agreements of the borrower were kept. During this long period of time the
lender, of course, looks to the borrower to pay the monthly
installment payments promptly when due. The lender
also expects the borrower to do all those other things
which an honest and responsible property owner would
do with respect to the property, such as paying taxes and
assessments on the property before they become delinquent, keeping the property adequately insured against
fire and other hazards, keeping the property in good condition and repair and free from tax liens, mechanic's liens
and other adverse claims, etc.
A lender may well be willing to make an $85,000
mortgage loan at 6Y-4 % for 10 years to a borrower who,
through his past dealings, has shown himself to be a
financially and morally responsible person and one from
whom the lender can expect prompt and complete performance of his legal and moral obligations.
Assume, however, that the party applying to the lender for a loan holds no property in his own name and has
numerous judgments entered against him with other suits
pending against him, or that he is then in bankruptcy, or
that there are over $200,000 in federal tax liens filed
against him, or that he is under federal indictment, or all
of the above. The lender in such a case would certainly
not make an $85,000 loan to that applicant and certainly
11

not for 10 years at
% interest. In fact, it is almost
certain that the lender would not make that applicant any
loan whatsoever. The reason is obvious. The first thing
a lender looks to in making a mortgage loan is the borrower himself, his financial and moral responsibility and
the prospect of an amicable and trouble free relationship
over the long years ahead.
The addendum in this case is an entirely reasonable
and proper provision to protect this legitimate interest of
the lender. Without it a borrower, after obtaining a large,
low interest rate, long term loan, could sell the property
to an irresponsible third party and thereby subject the
lender to continual defaults, harassments, trouble and
protracted litigation for years to come. To hold that the
addendum in this case is unenforceable is to tell a lender
that he has no right to consider the financial and moral
responsibility of the borrower in deciding the terms of a
loan, or in deciding whether a loan will be made at all.
Such a ruling would declare that a lender could not protect himself in preserving the principal inducement to his
making the loan in the first place - the identity of the
other contracting party. It would, in effect, tell a lender
that he has no choice in deciding with whom he will deal.
The courts have long recognized the right of a lender
to choose with whom he will deal, and have long upheld
the validity of provisions in mortgages and trust deeds
accelerating the unpaid balance of the indebtedness on
sale of the mortgaged property by the mortgagor. The
general rule regarding this matter is set forth in 59 CJS,
Mortgages §495(4), as follows:
12

"Where the agreement of the parties so provides, the principal sum secured by the mortgage
or deed of trust may be declared due and payable
immediately although otherwise not yet due, with
the consequent accrual of the right to foreclose on
default in the performance of any covenant or
agreement contained in the mortgage, or where
the mortgage so provides, on the breach of any
specific covenant on which the right to accelerate
is conditioned. Accordingly, where there is a provision therefor, the maturity of the debt secured by
the mortgage may be accelerated and the mortgage
foreclosed where there is default in the payment of
a prior encumbrance, default in the payment of
interest on a prior mortgage, default in the payment of other debts owed by the mortgagor to the
mortgagee, a sale by the mortgagor . . . " (emphasis added).
A 1970 case directly in point on this question is the
case of Peoples Savings Association v. Standard Industries,
Inc., 257 NE 2d 406, 22 Ohio App.2d 35. The mortgage
in that case
a clause which provided that if
there should be any change in the ownership of the
premises covered by the mortgage the mortgagee could
declare the entire unpaid balance of the mortgage immediately due and payable. The property in question was
later sold by the mortgagors to the defendant without the
consent of the mortgagee, and the mortgagee instituted
this action to foreclose the mortgage because of the sale.
The defendant contended that the provisions of the mortgage were illegal, inequitable and contrary to the public
policy of the State of Ohio and that the plaintiff could not
foreclose its mortgage because of the sale of the property
in violation of these provisions. This contention of de13

fendants was rejected by the Ohio Appellate Court. The
Court stated:
"Defendant-appellant argues t h a t public
policy makes the provision for acceleration based
on change of ownership void ab initio and that
this Court should so hold. Acceleration clauses
in mortgages are not new in Ohio. See 37 Ohio
jurisprudence 2d 268, Mortgages §80. See, also,
Nixon v. Buckeye Building & Loan Co. (1934), 18
Ohio Law Abstract, 261. In Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal.2d 311, 38 Cal.Rep. 505, 392 P.2d
265, Justice Trayner, in a thorough opinion, held
that a similar provision is a reasonable restraint
designed to protect justifiable interests of the parties. We concur, and hold that a significant element in the mortgage contract is the mortgagor
himself, his financial responsibility and his personal attitudes. The right of the mortgagee to
protect its security by maintaining control over
the identity and financial responsibility of the purchaser is a legitimate business objective and is not
illegal, inequitable or contrary to the public policy
of the State of Ohio."
The California Supreme Court took the same position as the Ohio Court in the case of Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 392 P.2d 265, 61 Cal 2d 311, in a unanimous opinion
written by Justice Trayner. In that case the plaintiff
brought action to foreclose after the borrower had conveyed the property in direct violation of the recorded
agreement between the plaintiff and the borrower preventing sale so long as the loan remained unpaid. The
defendants asserted the agreement to be void as an illegal
restraint on alienation. The California Supreme Court
rejected this contention, held the agreement valid and
affirmed a judgment of foreclosure.

14
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The most recent reported decision on this question is
the case of Cherry v. Homes Savings & Loan Association,
81 Cal. Rep. 135, (Cal. App. 1970). In that case, a trust
deed was executed which contained a clause that if the
rrustors conveyed the property or any interest therein
without the consent of the lender, the lender could declare the loan immediately due and payable. This was
held by the Court to be a valid provision and not to constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
None of the above cases presents as strong a case for
upholding validity of the addendum as does the case
before this Court. In none of the above cases does it
appear that the borrower and the ultimate owner agreed
prior to the time the loan was made that the acceleration
provisions of the addendum be made a part of the trust
deed. In none of the above cases does it appear that the
borrower and the party who later acquired title to the
property agreed prior to the time the loan made that the
loan be made on the basis of this provision. Yet all the
above cases uphold the validity of such a provision without these added elements. It is respectfully submitted that
the position which has been taken by the California and
the Ohio Courts is the position which should be adopted
by this court and that a duly recorded provision in a
mortgage or trust deed which permits a mortgagee to
treat a transfer of the mortgaged property as a default
entitling the mortgagee to accelerate the mortgage is in
all events a valid and legal provision. Such should certainly be the rule in cases like the one in question here
where all parties attacking the validity of the addendum,

15

including the transferee, agreed to the provision before
the loan was made, agreed that the loan be made on the
basis of said provision, and then deliberately violated the
provision.
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO
ACCEPT THE TENDER OF DELINQUENT PAYMENTS, SINCE THE TENDER WAS NOT MADE
BY ANY PERSON ENTITLED TO MAKE TENDER
OR REINSTATE THE TRUST DEED.

In October of 1968, after the loan was three months
delinquent, John Elwood Dennett tendered to the plaintiff the check for the three delinquent installments. Dennett was told at that time that the tender could not be accepted because, among other things, Dennett was not the
borrower. It is plaintiff's contention that plaintiff was not
required to accept the tender since the tender was not
made by any person entitled to reinstate the trust deed
and bring the loan current.
It is a generally recognized principle of law that a
tender, in order to have any legal effect, must be made
by the debtor or someone representing him or by a person
having some legal interest in the property in question.
A stranger or mere volunteer cannot compel a mortgagee
to ;i.ccept his tender. 86 C]S, Tender §35; 59 C]S Mortgages §446 (A). This rule ha been codified in Utah insofar as a tender of delinquent payments to reinstate a trust
deed is concerned. The persons who are entitled to tender
delinquent payments and reinstate a trust deed are set
forth in §57-1-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. They are
16

the trustor, his successor in interest in the trust property,
one having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record
or a beneficiary under any subordinate trust deed. John
Elwood Dennett, at no time fell into any of the above
categories. The court found that Dennett at no time had
any legal interest in the real property. (R. 126-127)
It may be the contention of the Dennetts that the
tender was made on behalf of Herta K. Dennett. The
problem with this contention is that Dennett never informed the plaintiff that the tender was being made on her
behalf. In addition, the plaintiff had no way of knowing
at the time the tender was made that Herta K. Dennett
had any interest whatsoever in the real property. The
deed from Elsie Powers to Herta K. Dennett was not recorded at that time and, in fact, has not been recorded
to this date. (R. 13 5) The plaintiff should not be required
to exercise clairvoyant powers to determine on whose
behalf a tender is being made, and that the person on
whose behalf it is made has an interest in the property
entitling him to make such tender.

"Where a tender is made by one other than
the debtor, the creditor must be informed on whose
behalf it is made, or have an opportunity of knowing the authority by which it is made." 86 C]S

Tender §35.

Plaintiff was not required to accept the original tender because the tender was not made by or on behalf of
a party entitled to reinstate the trust deed. It is not required to accept the sums which have been deposited
with the court for the same reason. There has been de17

posited with the clerk of the court pursuant to the court's
order of May 7, 1970, as amended and extended, for pay.
ment on plaintiff's trust deed the sum of $22,433.38. Only
$238 of this sum was tendered by any person having any
interest whatsoever in the real property, while $23,195.38
of the amount tendered to the clerk was tendered by
complete strangers. The court specifically found:
"That with the exception of the check for
$238 which was delivered to the clerk on October
22, 1970, all of the deposits which were made were
made by third parties other than the persons who
are parties to this action." (R. 232)
The plaintiff cannot be required to accept payments
from such strangers to reinstate the trust deed.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO AC·
CEPT TENDER OF DELINQUENT PAYMENTS
SINCE THE TENDER WAS INSUFFICIENT IN
AMOUNT TO REINSTATE THE TRUST DEED.

The tender which was made by John Elwood Den·
nett on October 24, 1968, was $2,186.70, an amount equal
to three monthly principal and interest installment pay·
ments on the trust deed. Mr. Dennett was informed at
that time that his tender could not be accepted because,
among other things, it was insufficient to cover the late
charges, costs and attorneys' fees which the Bank had in·
curred. (R. 136-137)
A tender, in order to have any legal effect, must be
sufficient in amount to cover all sums which are then
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due to the creditor because of the default. As stated in
86 CJS, Tender §7:
"In order to constitute a valid tender, the
tenderer must offer a specific amount. While
such amount need not be beyond reasonable dispute, nothing short of an offer of everything that
creditor is entitled to receive is sufficient, and a
debtor must at his peril tender the entire sum due,
including all necessary expenses incurred or damages suffered by the creditor by reason of the
default of the debtor, and a mistake in tendering
an amount less than the sum due is the misfortune
of the tenderer, the tender having no legal significance if refused, and the position of the parties
remains the same as though no tender had been
made."
Dennett was informed by plaintiff when he made
his tender that the amount tendered was insufficient because it did not include the late charges as provided by
the trust deed note.* He was informed that the tender
was insufficient in failing to cover the costs of a foreclosure report which the plaintiff had obtained. He was
informed that the tender was insufficient in that it did
not cover the attorney's fees which the plaintiff had incurred and was told that these fees amounted to $300.
None of these sums was ever tendered by any party.
(R. 136, 137)
The right to reinstate a delinquent trust deed is conditioned upon payment of these sums. Where a person
who has a right to reinstate a trust deed tenders delin':'The trust deed note specifically provides for a late charge of 2%
of a delinquent installment not paid within 15 days. (R. 8)
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quent payments he is entitled to have the trust deed reinstated, provided he pays "the entire amount then due
under the terms of such trust deed and the obligation
secured thereby (including costs and expenses actually
incurred in enforcing the terms of such obligation, or
trust deed, and the trustees and attorneys' fees actually
incurred not exceeding in the aggregate $50 or one-half
of one percent of the entire of the unpaid principal sum
secured, whichever is greater) other than such portion
of principal as would not then be due had no default occurred . . " (§57-1-27 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended)
Even if the tender in this case had been made by a
party entitled to reinstate the trust deed, the tender would
have been insufficient because: ( 1) The failure to pay
the late charges on the delinquent installments which
were "then due under the terms of such trust deed and
the obligation secured thereby;" (2) The failure to pay
"the costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing
the terms of such obligation or trust deed," consisting of
$60 paid by plaintiff for a title report of the property
covered by the trust deed; and (3) The failure to pay
"the attorneys' fees actually incurred" of $300, which
was "less than one-half of one percent of the entire unpaid principal sum secured."
It is only when these sums have been paid by a person entitled to reinstate that the sums must be accepted
by the lender and the trust deed reinstated. The reason
that the law requires a defaulting borrower to pay these
amounts before being entitled to a reinstatement of his
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trust deed is that the lender would otherwise be without
a remedy to collect his costs and expenses. The Utah
Trust Deed Act prevents a lender from bringing any
personal action against the borrower until after the trust
deed has been foreclosed as provided in the Trust Deed
Act. §57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The Utah
One-Action Statute prevents any personal judgment from
being entered against a defaulting borrower until after
sheriff's sale of the property in question. §§78-37-1, 2,
Utah Code Annotated 1953. If the lender could not require as a condition to reinstatement of the trust deed
that the defaulting borrower pay the lender's costs and
the almost nominal attorney's fees specified in the Trust
Deed Act, the lender would be without a remedy for
recovering these sums.
POINT IV
THE TENDER WAS INADEQUATE AND OF
NO LEGAL EFFECT BECAUSE NOT KEPT GOOD
BY THE ONE MAKING THE TENDER.

A tender in order to have any legal effect must be
kept good at all times by the party making the tender.
He must at all times hold himself in readiness to pay
and his failure to do so amounts to an abandonment of
the tender. This is a rule which has always existed in
this State. The rule was initially enunciated by the Utah
Supreme Court in the case of Hymas v. Bamberger, IO
Utah 3, 36 Pac. 202 (1894) which concerned a written
tender made by a debtor to redeem a pledge of certain
securities. The court in that case stated:
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"The tender was made in writing, under
§3964, Comp. Laws 1888, which provides as fol.
lows:
'An offering in writing to pay a particular
sum of money . . . is, if not accepted equivalent to the actual production and tender of
of the money.'
Ordinarily, where a party makes a tender, independently of the statute, he must actually produce
the money to the creditor. It must be in sight, capable of immediate delivery, and the creditor be
allowed a reasonable time to determine the amount
due, and to declare whether he will accept. A
tender in writing under this statute is equivalent
to the actual production and tender of the money.
To have this effect, however, the party tendering
must have the ability to produce it, and must act
in good faith. Nor does such a tender deprive the
creditor of the allowance of a reasonable time in
which to ascertain the amount due, and to determine whether he will accept; and if he accepts, and
the debtor fails to produce the money, his tender
will be of no avail. Startup v. McDonald, 46 ECL
623; Moynahan v. Moore, 77 Am.Dec. 483; Proctor
v. Robinson, 35 Mich. 284; Smith t/, Walton, 5
Houston 141; Shugart v. Pattee, 37 Iowa 422.
Where a person makes a tender in writing, the
statute excuses him from actually producing the
money at the time of making the tender, but it
excuses no other act or requirement on his part
which would be necessary to make a valid tender,
independently of the statute. To hold otherwise
would be to turn the statute, which was intended
as a mere convenience into an instrument of fraud
to hinder and delay creditors in the collection of
their claims.'' (Emphasis added)
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This position was reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme
Court in the case of LeVine v. Whitehouse, 109 Pac. 2,
37 Utah 260 (1910).
The case of Cole v. Cole, 122 P.2d 201, 101 Utah 355
(1942) involved the validity of a tender of checks made
by the defendant to the clerk of the court pursuant to the
provisions of a divorce decree. The testimony at the hearing showed that the defendant had not maintained a sufficient balance in his banking account to cover the payment of the checks. The court held that the tender was
insufficient because a tender is not good unless it is a continuing good tender. The court stated:
"The general rule no doubt is, that where a
tender is made in a law case which, if accepted, is
intended to operate as payment of the debt, the
tender, if rejected, must, nevertheless, be kept
good." See also Sieverts v. White, 273 P.2d 974,
2 Utah 2d 351 (1954).
After Dennett's tender in this case had been rejected
by the plaintiff, Dennett wrote a letter to the plaintiff to
give the appearance that he was making a continuous
tender and was complying with the rules that a continuing
tender must be made and the tender must be kept good.
Accordingly, Mr. Dennett stated in his letter:
"The legal problem is keeping the tender continuous. To that end, I declare herewith, a continuing willingness, readiness, and ability to perform the requirements of the lien instrument."
(Exhibit D-52(D))
It is not what Dennett said about his willingness,
readiness and ability to pay that is important, however,
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but the facts which are shown by the record concerning
his unwillingness, unreadiness and inability to keep the
tender good. By the Court's order of May 7, 1970, all
delinquent sums were required to be paid by June 1,
1970. (R. 142) The court extended the time for making
these payments to July 30, 1970. (R. 142, 231) This time
was further extended by the court to September 30, 1970,
at which time Mr. Dennett appealed to the District Court
for a further extension. (R. 173, 212, 231) The court then
extended the time in which the payments were to be made
to October 20, 1970. (R. 212, 232) It was not until October 26, 1970 until the final payment was made to the
clerk of the court. (R. 232) Almost six months elapsed
between the time of the court's order of May 7, 1970 which
required the delinquent installments to be paid, and the
date on which Dennett was apparently willing to come up
with sufficient money to pay the delinquencies under the
trust deed.
Dennett's compliance with the Court's order to tender
all delinquencies by October 26, 1970, was apparent
only. Although the supplemental findings of fact and
conclusions of law recite the checks which were tendered
to the clerk of the court by October 26, 1970, (R. 232),
and although the Court concluded that the tender of these
checks was made in substantial compliance with prior
orders of the Court as from time to time extended (R.
233), in fact, one of the checks representing part of the
tendered money bounced. The check of Herta Dennett
in the sum of $238.00 was returned unpaid to the Salt
Lake County Treasurer by the drawee bank. This was not
merely the result of some mistake or oversight on the part
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of the bank or maker. The failure was deliberate. Payment of the check had been stopped. (R. 245)
The failure and refusal of Dennett to keep his tender
good did not stop with obtaining a judgment and decree
preventing Walker Bank from foreclosing on the ground
that his tender was good, however. The judgment and
decree ordered that until the appeal in this case is decided,
the monthly installment payments commencing with the
November, 1970, payment, be paid when due to the clerk
of the court. It further ordered that the amount of the
1970 real property taxes assessed against the property be
paid to the Clerk on or before November 30, 1970. (R.
224) Before two weeks had elapsed from the entry of this
order, the order had been violated and Dennett's "continu·
ing tender" had again failed. (R. 261)
It is respectfully submitted that where a court finds
that a tender was made which should have been accepted,
the court may refuse to grant plaintiff the right to foreclose provided that the continuing tender which was
made is immediately made good by the tenderer. The
Court has no power, however, to refuse to grant plaintiff
the right to foreclose, and, at the same time, give the
tenderer six months, nine months, a year, or more, to decide whether or not to make his continuing tender good.

Dennett's continued unwillingness to keep his "continuing tender" good constituted an abandonment of his
tender under Utah law. The record in this case is clear
that from October of 1968 to the present time, the only
thing "continuing" in this lawsuit is not Dennett's tender,
but the defaults and delinquencies under the trust deed.
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CONCLUSION
The findings of the trial court establish the execution
and recording of the addendum to trust deed which gave
the plaintiff the right to have the entire unpaid balance
of the trust deed due and payable should A. P. Neilson
transfer any interest in the property. The court found that
prior to the time the loan was closed, this addendum was
shown to John Elwood Dennett and Dennett agreed that
the loan close on the basis of the said addendum. The
court further found that less than a year and a half later
Dennett arranged for the transfer of the property from
A. P. Neilson to one Elsie S. Powers in direct and deliberate violation of the
of the said addendum.
lt is the contention of plaintiff that the trial court
was in error in concluding as a matter of law that the
addendum was void as being against public policy, and in
ruling that plaintiff had no right to foreclose its trust
deed because of the deliberate violation of the terms of
the addendum. Plaintiff believes that this court should
adopt the position which has been taken by all of the
recent decisions on this point and should recognize that a
significant element in a mortgage contract is the mortgagor himself, his financial and moral responsibility, and
his personal attitudes. 1t is respectfully submitted that
the addendum in this case is a valid and legally enforceable provision protecting these legitimate business interests of the plaintiff and that plaintiff has the right to
foreclose because of the deliberate violation of said
addendum.
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After Dennett arranged for the trans£er of the property in violation of the addendum, payments on the trust
deed ceased until the latter part of October, 1968, when
Dennett's tender of delinquent installments was made.
Plaintiff further contends that it has the right to foreclose
its trust deed because no valid tender of the delinquent
payments was ever made. The tender which Dennett
made in October of 1968 was insufficient in amount and
was not made by any person entitled to reinstate the trust
deed or by anyone from whom the plaintiff was required
to accept the tender. The insufficient tender which was
made was abandoned by Dennett because of his failure
to keep his tender good.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the

trial court should be reversed and that the case should be
remanded to the trial court to fix the amount of attorneys'
fees and costs to be awarded to the plaintiff, to direct
disposition of the funds in the hands of the Court and for
foreclosure of the trust deed in the manner provided by
law for the foreclosure of mortgages.
Respectfully submitted,
H. R. Waldo, Jr.
Roger J. McDonough
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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